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 Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted on June 10, 
1999 Kosovo was put under the international civil administration named 
UNMIK (UN mission in Kosovo).  During the several years UNMIK 
exercised its powers in Kosovo based on four established pillars. A lots of 
debates were developed within the academic world about the role of UNMIK 
in Kosovo, its functions and especially the role it played for the process of 
the state building in Kosovo. A series of question were raise permanently 
about whether this mission was only a civil administration or it was a 
modern type of protectorate. Of course there were also other discussions 
developed regarding the UNMIK issue in Kosovo. The paper intends to 
explain the UNMIK mission and its legal basis with the special emphasizes 
the role it played in the process of Kosovo independence and the state 
building process. Some claim that UNMIK had a symbolic role in the 
process of state building whereas it had no role at all in the process of 
Kosovo independence. Paper analyses the entire process of UNMIK and 
comes up with findings as well as with the recommendations these types of 
international administrations should take into the consideration in the future 
if the need appears. 
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Introduction 
         This paper deals with the Interim Administration Mission to the United 
Nations - UNMIK and the contribution or failure of this Mission in the 
process of state-building and the functioning of the institutions of Kosovo, 
based on resolution S/RE /1244 adopted by the Security Council in its 
meeting no. 4011, dated  June 10, 1999.90 
 UNMIK began establishing Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government (PISG) immediately after its settlement in Kosovo in June 1999. 
                                                 
90 http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/03albanian/Res1244ALB.pdf 
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Institutions established by UNMIK, since their establishment have been 
more symbolic institutions governing how decision-making institutions as 
the all power was in the hands of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG), who had all legislative and executive powers, including the 
administration of justice. 
 Regarding the administrative organization of the Interim 
Administration, UNMIK headed by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, as the highest civilian authority in Kosovo, which is 
within the powers and responsibilities himself had his four deputies. Each of 
the Deputy SRSG was also the Chairman of the so-called "pillar", which was 
in charge in carrying out certain administrative functions. There were four 
such columns, where each "pillar" included and ran a certain international 
organizations, such as: 
- Pillar I: Police and Justice led by the Organization of the United Nations 
- Pillar II: Civil Administration, led by the UN 
- Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Establishing, led by the OSCE 
- Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European 
Union91 
 
Applicable Law: Theory and Practice 
 On July 15, 1999 Secretary General of the UN Kofi Atta Annan 
appointed French Special Envoy Bernard Kouchner, who replaced Vieira de 
Mellon who was at the top of UNMIK in Kosovo for several weeks. 
Bernard Kouchner, July 16, established the Kosovo Transitional Council, 
allowing leaders with informal participation in the policy review92 in Kosovo 
Transition Council entered three of the signatories of 
the Rambouillet Agreement: 
- Ibrahim Rugova. President and historic leader of Kosovo, 
- Hashim Thaçi: political -director Kosovo Liberation Army. 
- Rexhep Çosja - Chairman of LBD and a minor party 
- Rada Trajkovic - A nationalist Serbian community representative  
 Although Kosovo Transitional Council was conceived as a 
consultative body between the Decree of the SRSG and community 
representatives, however it was an important coordinating body because it as 
anticipated termination of existed Albanian structures, such as  those 
parallel  ones that had governed Kosovo during years 1990-1998, the Kosovo 
                                                 
91 Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development. Political research Series Special 
Edition. Administration and Governance in Kosovo. Lessons learned and those that 
remaining to be studied p.2 
92 Buxhovi. Y. (2009). “Historic Turn-West struggle for Kosovo”:  Faik Konica, Prishtina, 
Weller, M. (2009): “Citizenship contest”. Pristina.  
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Liberation Army and all the others, whereas they failed or were not so 
interested in abolishing the parallel structures in particular Serbian 
communities in northern Kosovo and in this way determined permanent 
obstacles of Kosovo state building and functioning. 
 During the first stage of the International Ruling, in early 2000 the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of the UN in 
Kosovo, Mr. Bernard Kouchner, also created "Joint Interim Administrative 
Structure" (JIAC). This structure consisted of twenty departments with 
responsibility for civil administration. These departments were headed 
jointly by a foreign official (international) and one local.93 Municipal 
elections and the establishment of local self-government structures were 
planned in the second phase in 2000, whereas, in the third phase was 
envisaged self-conditional government, which had to comply with the 
requirements of the Constitutional Framework adopted in 2001.94 
 Since the post-war period in 1999 Kosovo was ruled by the Mission 
of International Community on the basis of the Resolution 1244 of the 
United Nations, on such basis it was treated and considered as a "sue 
generis" country and issue. 
 As the United Nations Mission consisted of many states and many 
more nations in itself implied different stands, mentalities of different 
interests related to the same issues ... For this reason the issue of Kosovo 
did not reflect as a successful story lead by International Community. 
 
Kosovo Elections organized by the OSCE 
 In Kosovo, during the period 2000- 010 were held four (4) first local 
elections and four (4) first general elections, which mean that over a period 
of 10 years, were held 8 with different systems and election rules. 
 Almost each elections were held, this has cost the poor and after the 
war Kosovo a great deal in every respect, and have influenced the continuity 
that the constituted institutions by these elections to be disrespected and 
distrustful from the population! As in local elections as well as in the general 
elections there had been numerous and unnecessary experiments. 
 Unclean lists, one after another electoral processes from deceased 
persons, persons who emigrated from Kosovo and got another nationality 
etc. were made on purpose and planned ahead on the basis of preliminary 
agreements of the International Mission and Kosovo Leadership, because 
together they sustained each other and continued to lead Kosovo according 
to their individual and group interests. For this reason, Kosovo since the 
                                                 
93Yusuf Buxhovi. Historic Turn-West struggle for Kosovo. Faik Konica, Prishtina, 2009. 
Weller, Marc. Citizenship contest. Pristina 2009, p.515 
94  Weller, M. (2009): “ Citizenship contest”:  Prishtina, p.301 
European Scientific Journal May 2015 edition vol.11, No.13  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
346 
installation of the UN Mission in Kosovo until its completion was led by the 
same "Political Elite" which entered politics as a family were considered 
economically poor and after several years they had become very powerful 
and rich. The more rich they became Kosovo was more impoverished, 
because they became rich not based on their work but on the basis of misuse 
of their political position ie installation or institutional corruption allowing 
International Mission which had stimulated corruption for two reasons: one 
to easily lead Kosovo and the other side to make disciplinable Kosovar 
leadership and to blackmail when they tend to change their rules of the game 
'as defined by them ... 
 The Mission of UNMIK was initially planned to be accomplished 
within a specified time frame, which also would be accomplished if from the 
beginning more space would be offered to local population in participation 
decision-making processes and responsibilities. 
 The participation of the local population with UNMIK and its 
structures was primarily selected based on two of their basic criteria: 
subordination and obedience. This has made the local responsibility to be 
irrelevant. Kosovars, in principle and at least in the early stages of 
deployment and implementation of the power of UNMIK, supported this 
power. The reasons for this support can be explained naturally easy. Kosovo 
had a power, in a powerless situation. In a situation where everything was 
destroyed. However, this situation should at least be assumed that it could 
not without any measure and time restrictions. 
 Duties of the transfer of power from UNMIK to Interim Institutions 
Kosovo were associated with difficulties. After the first parliamentary 
elections, the power of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in 
Kosovo had divided into two political entities: the PDK95 and the LDK96. 
This government formation was previously conceived and even after the 
legitimization of the formation of the Kosovo Government and the Kosovo 
Assembly, UNMIK departments transferred only some minor Administrative 
and Executive Functions to the PISG Authorities and Ministries. Instead of 
transfer, UNMIK continued to hold large number of powers reserved for the 
SRSG in key policy areas, such as the police and the judiciary, in accordance 
with the Constitutional Framework. SRSG regularly continued to use veto to 
block legislation in the Assembly, if it confronted the Resolution 1244 and 
held extended control over the legislative and executive powers, while 
issuing a number of directives and regulations.97 
                                                 
95 Political party lead by Hashim Thaçi, known as war political party 
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 Knowing that UNMIK authority had exercised its functions for the 
benefit of the local population, it cannot be contested, because, in fact, if 
UNMIK Mission was not installed, anarchy and war for overpower and 
certain power of groups would bring to the people of extremely sad an 
imposed cost to Kosovo. 
 On the other hand, one of the tasks of UNMIK, arguably the most 
important in the long term, was to bring the territory to a level in which 
issues related to foreign status, can be considered.98 Moreover, even at the 
beginning of its establishment, and at all times of its existence, the political 
vision of UNMIK wasn’t totally clear. Furthermore, no International 
Administration cannot function without a political vision, implied or stated 
for the society it administers.99 
 The power of the SRSG in many forms also depended on the 
personality of the holders of this function. Kouchner, for example, will be 
remembered as a very dynamic and willing for close cooperation with local 
authorities. Holker100 was recognized as pretty cool and rigid, whereas, the 
arrival of Petersen, after Holker’s withdrawal accelerated transfer of powers 
from UNMIK to the PISG, through the creation of Ministries, which until 
then belonged to the reserved power sectors, such as police and justice, 
border control and Trust of Kosovo (who supervised the privatization, 
imposed by UNMIK to Socially Owned Enterprises) 101. The said Head 
Administrator was also recognized for excels and acceleration of the process 
for determining of final status of Kosovo. 
     
Talks for final status 
 It was clear that the International Civil Administration could remain 
forever in Kosovo. In the early post-war years, this power was considered to 
have been very useful and effective to certain extent. But, as the time went 
on, this mechanism lost its popular support in Kosovo, which had already 
required something more. This "something" was more aspiration for 
Kosovo's state-building and for the determination of its final status. But, to 
be introduced in the process of negotiations for the final status of Kosovo, 
                                                 
98 KIPRED, Administration and Governance in Kosovo -A project coordinated by CASIN: 
2005, the Pristina-Geneva,p. 3. 
99 KIPRED, Administration and Governance in Kosovo -A project coordinated by CASIN: 
2005, the Pristina-Geneva,3 
 100In its mandate occurring "The events of March 2004" when large number of people 
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the International Community suggested some preconditions, which had to be 
met.  It was Head Administrator Steiner   who suggested the so-called 
"standards before status"102, which had served as a base document and a 
measure, that after assessing whether the terms had been met or not, they 
would lit the green light to move forward with negotiations for the final 
status. 
Based on this, we can draw a conclusion that the Standards for 
Kosovo document signed on  December 10 2003 by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General Harri Holkeri and Kosovo Prime 
Minister Bajram Rexhepi, was a kind of exit strategy, which enabled the exit 
from the status quo being reigned in Kosovo. In fact, in Kosovo on March 
17, 2004, there was an explosion, the causes of which, among other things, 
were just delays in development, non- status quo and no definition the 
courses. So within a long period of time for Kosovo, there were reports, 
which opened the direction for future, generating concrete recommendations. 
In July 2004, the Special Representative Kai Eide, the United Nations 
recommended the transfer of power to the Provisional Institutions of Self-
government and recommended to start with a “discussion on status."103 Later 
on, we had the second report of Kai Eide, entitled "Comprehensive Review 
of the Situation in Kosovo", which will be the key and guide for the launch 
of negotiations on the final status of Kosovo. This report was dated October 
7, 2005. It should be noted that on this occasion and should be inserted in the 
text, was the statement of the Contact Group regarding the report of 
Kai Eide, which is explained as follows: 
Contact Group reviewed the letter of the Secretary-General and 
Ambassador Kai Eide's report on the comprehensive review of the situation 
in Kosovo, submitted to the Security Council on  October 7 2005. The 
Contact Group supported the recommendations of the Secretary-General 
submitted to the Security Council, based in this report to start the process of 
determining the future status of Kosovo in accordance with the Resolution 
1244 of the Security Council. The Group welcomed the intention of the 
Secretary-General on the appointment of a Special Envoy, who will lead this 
process. Contact Group gladly supported the efforts of the Special Envoy and 
his team. A negotiated solution should be an international priority and that 
process which has begun cannot be blocked, but should finish. 
                                                 
102Steiner. promotes access to something that marks the exit from the status quo initiative 
that had become unbearable, especially Kosovo Albanians risked already expressed their 
dissatisfaction in other ways 
103 Look Raport for Kosovo. (2007).  No good alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan, ICG – 
International Crisis Group, Europe Report nr. 182:  Prishtina, (Beograd, New York), 
Brussels, p.7. 
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State building and state-building stagnation, as barrier for advancing 
international position Kosovo 
 There were various discussions and debates on relation to this matter, 
if Kosovo state building had started even before the Declaration of 
Independence. In addition, it depends on perspective and approach that 
anyone can be against the state, elements, components, structures, etc. state. 
But let us give an accepted definition about the state before the process will 
be briefly briefly discussed.  The state is an institution created by the group 
aiming to accomplish several goals, of which the most important is the 
maintenance of law and order within its borders and the preservation of the 
independence of people in relationships with other people.104 The state-
building process, according to a perspective is said to be as follows: State 
building Mission in Kosovo was a type of International Intervention, which 
was introduced in 1990. Similar Missions have been or are being developed 
in countries such as Afghanistan or East Timor. Dedication characteristic of 
this type of intervention is military and civilian aspects (Bieber, 2003: 2). 
 The Mission of stat-building deployed in Kosovo, and under the 
authority of UNMIK is called multidimensional peace operation or operation 
of the second generation of United Nations peacekeepers (Pula, 2003: 199). 
Kosovo, based on the specific path of state building in the context of meeting 
the criteria for integration, was not equal to other Balkan countries and the 
countries that have emerged as a result of the disintegration of former 
Yugoslavia. 
 Within the framework of the Stability Pact, it should be added that 
Kosovo was set up a special mechanism called Tracking Mechanism of 
Stabilization and Association Agreement. This mechanism came into effect 
in 2003. 
 Guidelines for stat-building are early aspirations of the people of 
Kosovo. But the risk for undergoing a process of state failure is not that they 
are small and far from the mind in Kosovo. Corruption, organized crime, 
ungrounded enrichment of political representative elites, the recycling of 
people with bad background, etc., were present in Kosovo in the process of 
stat-building. 
 What even more complicates situation is the fact that Kosovo since 
1999 hasn’t independently been governed by locals. Kosovo has been ruled 
by Internationals, co-governance and International Supervision. In all three 
versions of this government none can be excluded from liability. Even not 
rarely corruption practices was in close cooperation with locals and 
                                                 
104 Svarlien, citeted from  Gruda, Z. (2007).  “International Public Law”:  Furkan ISM-
Shkup, p. 69. 
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internationals. And that in way the failed state-building risk was planned and 
mentioned also in the report of Ambassador Kai Eide, where he says: 
"International Community must do everything to ensure whatever status will 
be and do not allow the status to fail.  "Entering this future status does not 
mean that we are entering the last stage, but we are entering into the next 
stage of the international presence.105 
 Since the stability of the Region is of great importance for the 
International Community and since Kosovo Serbia reports may have more 
potential outbreak, International Community somehow has closed the eyes 
before some phenomena, which would not have been allowed anywhere and 
in any democracy or state. This is because for the sake of negotiations with 
Serbia a certain extent misrule was tolerated, aiming not to endanger the 
process of negotiations. "One Commission Official the admitted that for the 
sake of EU stability in government was necessary, which is committed to 
dialogue, tolerated in silence a parliamentary control of the 
government the Commission Official warned by the Government of Kosovo, 
saying that you are among the few countries where the government controls 




 Related to effectiveness of UNMIK governance in Kosovo there are 
different opinions. Some think that it was quite useless and prevented the 
development of Kosovo. Others share the opinion that without THE presence 
UNMIK in that period especially in the first years of post-war reality or life 
of its citizens would be more than the risk not only from the Serbian state, 
but also by certain Albanian circles. 
 Without the existence of an International Civilian Administration in 
Kosovo the return of nearly 1 million refugees to their homes would be much 
more difficult. Formation of government institutions without UNMIK would 
be much more problematic because the installed political system would 
certainly not be democratic. 
 UNMIK created the Kosovo Governing Institutions 
 There are many areas in which UNMIK has invested a lot, but the 
achievements have been limited, in particular related to investments and 
commitment to inter-ethnic dialogue. Economic Development is the area 
where UNMIK also failed to succeed. No successes reached and almost 
nothing was done to fight corruption but, in contrary, it has further 
                                                 
105 Report on a Comprehensive Review, UN documents S/2005/635. 
106 Forum 2015, Kosovo-EU Relations: The history of unfulfilled Aspirations? Kosovo 
Foundation for Open Society, Prishtina 2013, p. 31. 
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stimulated and helped it. Not rarely due to its bureaucracy and more 
uncertainty to many official mission and its responsible UNMIK has 
prevented or slowed the development process and the functioning of Kosovo 
four pillars of UNMIK Mission had managed post-conflict situation, the 
construction of peace (peacebuilding) and the creation of institutions 
(institution building) for a long time. Later, after the Declaration of 
Independence, its role was mainly focused on the facilitation of 
communication and dialogue with the Serbian minorities in Kosovo 
and Serbia  regarded at the interstate level. 
 In the end if we  analyse the whole process of UNMIK in the context 
Kosovo reality, during and after the war, we may come with a conclusion 
that the International Mission of UNMIK in Kosovo was more than 
necessary as such, but it would for sure be more successful if the members of 
that Mission were experts and professionals who have at least basic 
knowledge about the people of Kosovo and the Region, their culture and 
particularly the causes of war,  and not its staff to be determined based the 
comprehensive involvement of the states member of the UN. 
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